What is your answer?
Which steps of Aquinas's "third way" argument does Plantinga object to?
1. Every contingent entity at some time or other fails to exist.
2. Therefore, if everything were contingent, then there'd be some one time when everything failed to exist -- and so nothing would exist now (which is clearly false).
3. Therefore, not everything is contingent -- so some being is necessary.
4. If there is a necessary being, then there is a God.
5. Therefore, there is a God.
<= back | menu | forward =>
Directions: Click on a number from 1 to 3.
1 is wrong. Please try again.
Which steps of Aquinas's "third way" argument does Plantinga object to?
1. Every contingent entity at some time or other fails to exist.
2. Therefore, if everything were contingent, then there'd be some one time when everything failed to exist -- and so nothing would exist now (which is clearly false).
3. Therefore, not everything is contingent -- so some being is necessary.
4. If there is a necessary being, then there is a God.
5. Therefore, there is a God.
{ 1 } - Step 2.
{ 2 } - Steps 2 and 5.
{ 3 } - Steps 1, 2, and 5.
Against 1, a contingent entity could be eternal. Against 2, it could be that each contingent entity at some time or other fails to exist -- but there's no one time when everything fails to exist. Against 5, there's no reason to think that this necessary being has to be God (personal, all-good, etc.).
<= back | menu | forward =>
2 is wrong. Please try again.
Which steps of Aquinas's "third way" argument does Plantinga object to?
1. Every contingent entity at some time or other fails to exist.
2. Therefore, if everything were contingent, then there'd be some one time when everything failed to exist -- and so nothing would exist now (which is clearly false).
3. Therefore, not everything is contingent -- so some being is necessary.
4. If there is a necessary being, then there is a God.
5. Therefore, there is a God.
{ 1 } - Step 2.
{ 2 } - Steps 2 and 5.
{ 3 } - Steps 1, 2, and 5.
Against 1, a contingent entity could be eternal. Against 2, it could be that each contingent entity at some time or other fails to exist -- but there's no one time when everything fails to exist. Against 5, there's no reason to think that this necessary being has to be God (personal, all-good, etc.).
<= back | menu | forward =>
3 is correct!
Which steps of Aquinas's "third way" argument does Plantinga object to?
1. Every contingent entity at some time or other fails to exist.
2. Therefore, if everything were contingent, then there'd be some one time when everything failed to exist -- and so nothing would exist now (which is clearly false).
3. Therefore, not everything is contingent -- so some being is necessary.
4. If there is a necessary being, then there is a God.
5. Therefore, there is a God.
{ 1 } - Step 2.
{ 2 } - Steps 2 and 5.
{ 3 } - Steps 1, 2, and 5.
Against 1, a contingent entity could be eternal. Against 2, it could be that each contingent entity at some time or other fails to exist -- but there's no one time when everything fails to exist. Against 5, there's no reason to think that this necessary being has to be God (personal, all-good, etc.).
<= back | menu | forward =>
Before continuing, you might try some wrong answers.
the end