Russell thinks that the metaphysically ultimate constituents of matter are
Russell thinks that the metaphysically ultimate constituents of matter are
Russell sees atomic and subatomic particles as logical fictions, or as mere ways of speaking about our sensations. To do science, we needn't take any stand on whether these particles really exist. It suffices that they are useful ways of thinking about matter and that they help us to make predictions about what sensations will occur.
In a similar way, Russell thinks of tables and chairs as logical fictions, or as mere ways of speaking about our sensations. There's very little evidence to either affirm or deny the existence of tables and chairs as independently existing objects.
From the standpoint of our knowledge, sensations are basic.
Russell thinks that the metaphysically ultimate constituents of matter are
Russell sees atomic and subatomic particles as logical fictions, or as mere ways of speaking about our sensations. To do science, we needn't take any stand on whether these particles really exist. It suffices that they are useful ways of thinking about matter and that they help us to make predictions about what sensations will occur.
In a similar way, Russell thinks of tables and chairs as logical fictions, or as mere ways of speaking about our sensations. There's very little evidence to either affirm or deny the existence of tables and chairs as independently existing objects.
From the standpoint of our knowledge, sensations are basic.