What is the best match?

We ought to be conscientious because an ideal observer would desire this.

    { 1 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - Kantian justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - ideal-observer-theory justification

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Directions: Click on a number from 1 to 5.
























 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

























1 is wrong. Please try again.

We ought to be conscientious because an ideal observer would desire this.

Since an ought judgment is a prescription that logically entails the corresponding imperative (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to action under pain of inconsistency. Thus conscientiousness is justified as a species of logical consistency. <=> prescriptivism justification

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2 is wrong. Please try again.

We ought to be conscientious because an ideal observer would desire this.

    { 1 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - Kantian justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - ideal-observer-theory justification

Violating conscientiousness is inherently bad and thus ought other-things-equal to be avoided. <=> prima-facie-duty justification

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3 is wrong. Please try again.

We ought to be conscientious because an ideal observer would desire this.

    { 1 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - Kantian justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - ideal-observer-theory justification

Since an ought judgment is a truth that logically entails the corresponding imperative, such judgments have a rational authority. If we accept an ought judgment but don't act on it, then we are logically inconsistent and violate rationality. <=> Kantian justification

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4 is wrong. Please try again.

We ought to be conscientious because an ideal observer would desire this.

    { 1 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - Kantian justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - ideal-observer-theory justification

We ought to be conscientious because God desire this. <=> divine-command-theory justification

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5 is correct!

We ought to be conscientious because an ideal observer would desire this.

    { 1 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - Kantian justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - ideal-observer-theory justification

We ought to be conscientious because an ideal observer would desire this. <=> ideal-observer-theory justification

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