Kant in a footnote objected that GR leads to absurd results, since a criminal could use it against the judge who sentences him. The criminal could say, "Since you wouldn't want to be sentenced to jail if you were in my place, you ought not to sentence me to jail." To this we may respond that the criminal's GR formula is incorrect, since it
Kant in a footnote objected that GR leads to absurd results, since a criminal could use it against the judge who sentences him. The criminal could say, "Since you wouldn't want to be sentenced to jail if you were in my place, you ought not to sentence me to jail." To this we may respond that the criminal's GR formula is incorrect, since it
It wrongly talks about what the judge would desire under different conditions -- namely if he were a criminal about to be sentenced. This has little to do with whether the judge is consistent now. Instead, we need to talk about the judge's present reaction to a hypothetical case.
We could also give the other response.
Kant in a footnote objected that GR leads to absurd results, since a criminal could use it against the judge who sentences him. The criminal could say, "Since you wouldn't want to be sentenced to jail if you were in my place, you ought not to sentence me to jail." To this we may respond that the criminal's GR formula is incorrect, since it
It wrongly uses the if-then form.
We could also give the other response.
Kant in a footnote objected that GR leads to absurd results, since a criminal could use it against the judge who sentences him. The criminal could say, "Since you wouldn't want to be sentenced to jail if you were in my place, you ought not to sentence me to jail." To this we may respond that the criminal's GR formula is incorrect, since it
If the sentence is just, judges should be willing that they (or their loved ones) be jailed for similar crimes in similar circumstances.
Kant's example is like the one about punishing the child (see Section 5.2).