Austin tells us that talk of deception only makes sense against a background of general non-deception.
Austin tells us that talk of deception only makes sense against a background of general non-deception.
He says that it must be possible to recognize a case of deception, by checking the odd case against the more normal cases. So it makes sense to say "My gasoline gauge sometimes deceives us" (since such gauges are normally accurate and can be checked for accuracy). But it's puzzling to say "My crystal ball sometimes deceives me" (what would the "normal" case here be?).
Austin on this point may perhaps remind you of Ayer and his verifiability criterion of meaning.
Austin tells us that talk of deception only makes sense against a background of general non-deception.
He says that it must be possible to recognize a case of deception, by checking the odd case against the more normal cases. So it makes sense to say "My gasoline gauge sometimes deceives us" (since such gauges are normally accurate and can be checked for accuracy). But it's puzzling to say "My crystal ball sometimes deceives me" (what would the "normal" case here be?).
Austin on this point may perhaps remind you of Ayer and his verifiability criterion of meaning.