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Many philosophers argue: "In cases of illusion, we perceive something -- but not material objects; so in these cases we must perceive sense data." Austin objects to this by pointing out

    { 1 } - that even if we don't perceive a material object, we have other ways to describe our experience; we needn't bring in sense data.
    { 2 } - that in cases of illusion, we often perceive a material object, but perceive it wrongly.
    { 3 } - both of these objections.

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1 is wrong. Please try again.

Many philosophers argue: "In cases of illusion, we perceive something -- but not material objects; so in these cases we must perceive sense data." Austin objects to this by pointing out

We can use other terms -- like "I saw a mirage" or "I had an hallucination." We can describe such cases without using words like "sense data."

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2 is wrong. Please try again.

Many philosophers argue: "In cases of illusion, we perceive something -- but not material objects; so in these cases we must perceive sense data." Austin objects to this by pointing out

    { 1 } - that even if we don't perceive a material object, we have other ways to describe our experience; we needn't bring in sense data.
    { 2 } - that in cases of illusion, we often perceive a material object, but perceive it wrongly.
    { 3 } - both of these objections.

For example, the arrangement of lines may, due to an optical illusion, lead us to think that one line is longer than the other. Here we have an optical illusion; but we still are perceiving a material object.

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3 is correct!

Many philosophers argue: "In cases of illusion, we perceive something -- but not material objects; so in these cases we must perceive sense data." Austin objects to this by pointing out

    { 1 } - that even if we don't perceive a material object, we have other ways to describe our experience; we needn't bring in sense data.
    { 2 } - that in cases of illusion, we often perceive a material object, but perceive it wrongly.
    { 3 } - both of these objections.

In many optical-illusion cases, we still are perceiving a real material object. The illusion may only trick us into thinking that one stick is longer than the other.

In cases where there's no material object, we can say things like "I had an hallucination." We can describe such cases without using words like "sense data."

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