Many philosophers argue: "A veridical perception of a chair often looks exactly the same as a non-veridical perception (in which we are dreaming or hallucinating); so in both cases we are directly perceiving the same thing -- namely, sense data." Austin objects to this by pointing out
Many philosophers argue: "A veridical perception of a chair often looks exactly the same as a non-veridical perception (in which we are dreaming or hallucinating); so in both cases we are directly perceiving the same thing -- namely, sense data." Austin objects to this by pointing out
For example, dreams generally have a dream-like quality -- and there are usually signs that we are hallucinating.
But he also raises the other objection.
Many philosophers argue: "A veridical perception of a chair often looks exactly the same as a non-veridical perception (in which we are dreaming or hallucinating); so in both cases we are directly perceiving the same thing -- namely, sense data." Austin objects to this by pointing out
For example, a chair and a wax model of a chair can cause almost identical visual experiences; yet a chair is very unlike a wax model of a chair.
But he also raises the other objection.
Many philosophers argue: "A veridical perception of a chair often looks exactly the same as a non-veridical perception (in which we are dreaming or hallucinating); so in both cases we are directly perceiving the same thing -- namely, sense data." Austin objects to this by pointing out
Dreams and hallucinations generally have a dream-like quality. A non-veridical perception is seldom experienced in exactly the same way as a veridical one.
Even in cases where the two perceptions are experienced as exactly similar, we shouldn't conclude that both are caused by the same kind of object. A chair and a wax model of a chair can cause virtually identical visual experiences; yet a chair is very unlike a wax model of a chair.