Aquinas's "third way" argues that the existence of contingent beings (beings whose non-existence is possible) requires that there be a necessary being (a being whose non-existence is impossible). It further argues that this necessary being must be God.
Plantinga objects to this argument that
Aquinas's "third way" argues that the existence of contingent beings (beings whose non-existence is possible) requires that there be a necessary being (a being whose non-existence is impossible). It further argues that this necessary being must be God.
Plantinga objects to this argument that
Why couldn't this necessary being just be the universe itself?
Aquinas's "third way" argues that the existence of contingent beings (beings whose non-existence is possible) requires that there be a necessary being (a being whose non-existence is impossible). It further argues that this necessary being must be God.
Plantinga objects to this argument that
He thinks it that does make sense. He suggests, for example, that some numbers and propositions may exist in all possible worlds -- and so may be necessary beings.
Aquinas's "third way" argues that the existence of contingent beings (beings whose non-existence is possible) requires that there be a necessary being (a being whose non-existence is impossible). It further argues that this necessary being must be God.
Plantinga objects to this argument that
Plantinga examines the steps of the argument in a careful way -- and criticizes steps that seem to be weak or flawed. He wouldn't reject an argument just because it presupposes a picture of the world that (some?) modern people cannot accept.