On Quine's view, believing "Some zoological species are cross-fertile" commits us to recognizing as entities
On Quine's view, believing "Some zoological species are cross-fertile" commits us to recognizing as entities
"Some zoological species are cross-fertile" says that there is something that is a zoological species and is cross-fertile. For this to be true, the things over which the bound variable "something" ranges must include species. So the statement commits us to accepting species into our ontology.
We are so committed, at least until we devise some way to paraphrase the statement to show that the reference to species was an avoidable way of speaking.
On Quine's view, believing "Some zoological species are cross-fertile" commits us to recognizing as entities
"Some zoological species are cross-fertile" says that there is something that is a zoological species and is cross-fertile. For this to be true, the things over which the bound variable "something" ranges must include species. So the statement commits us to accepting species into our ontology.
We are so committed, at least until we devise some way to paraphrase the statement to show that the reference to species was an avoidable way of speaking.
On Quine's view, believing "Some zoological species are cross-fertile" commits us to recognizing as entities
"Some zoological species are cross-fertile" says that there is something that is a zoological species and is cross-fertile. For this to be true, the things over which the bound variable "something" ranges must include species. So the statement commits us to accepting species into our ontology.
We are so committed, at least until we devise some way to paraphrase the statement to show that the reference to species was an avoidable way of speaking.