Suppose that I say that this is the "same book" as the one I was reading last week.
According to Russell, this means that
Suppose that I say that this is the "same book" as the one I was reading last week.
According to Russell, this means that
The first view posits a mysterious and unobservable "metaphysical substance" that is present throughout time. The problem here is that there's no evidence that this "metaphysical substance" actually exists. All we observe is the qualities of the book.
Russell's approach is to say that there's something given in experience that makes us call it the "same book" -- and that this something (whatever it is) should constitute the total of what we mean when we say "same book."
Suppose that I say that this is the "same book" as the one I was reading last week.
According to Russell, this means that
The first view posits a mysterious and unobservable "metaphysical substance" that is present throughout time. The problem here is that there's no evidence that this "metaphysical substance" actually exists. All we observe is the qualities of the book.
Russell's approach is to say that there's something given in experience that makes us call it the "same book" -- and that this something (whatever it is) should constitute the total of what we mean when we say "same book."