You promise to go to Suzy's party. But you need to break this promise to drive a sick friend to the hospital. So you ought to break the promise.
Ross's prima facie view says that you ought to break the promise because
You promise to go to Suzy's party. But you need to break this promise to drive a sick friend to the hospital. So you ought to break the promise.
Ross's prima facie view says that you ought to break the promise because
The duty is genuine, but it's overridden by another duty.
You promise to go to Suzy's party. But you need to break this promise to drive a sick friend to the hospital. So you ought to break the promise.
Ross's prima facie view says that you ought to break the promise because
One duty is more binding than the other. We discover which duty is more binding in the concrete situation by appealing to intuition (according to Ross) or to what we desire insofar as we are rational (according to Ima Rossian).
You promise to go to Suzy's party. But you need to break this promise to drive a sick friend to the hospital. So you ought to break the promise.
Ross's prima facie view says that you ought to break the promise because
This is the utilitarian answer, and Ross's prima facie view would reject it.