What is the best match?
GR consistency condition (as seen by prescriptivism)
{ 1 } - "Good" can be defined using ideas from sense experience.
{ 2 } - Statement that is testable by sense experience (and thus can in principle be shown by sense experience to be true or at least highly probable)
{ 3 } - Known truth that requires no further proof or justification
{ 4 } - Moral judgments, while they express emotions and not truth claims, are rational to the extent that they are informed and impartial
{ 5 } - This combination is logically inconsistent: (a) I believe that I ought to do something to another, and (b) I don't desire that this be done to me in the same situation
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Directions: Click on a number from 1 to 5.
1 is wrong. Please try again.
GR consistency condition (as seen by prescriptivism)
{ 1 } - "Good" can be defined using ideas from sense experience.
{ 2 } - Statement that is testable by sense experience (and thus can in principle be shown by sense experience to be true or at least highly probable)
{ 3 } - Known truth that requires no further proof or justification
{ 4 } - Moral judgments, while they express emotions and not truth claims, are rational to the extent that they are informed and impartial
{ 5 } - This combination is logically inconsistent: (a) I believe that I ought to do something to another, and (b) I don't desire that this be done to me in the same situation
naturalism <=> "Good" can be defined using ideas from sense experience.
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2 is wrong. Please try again.
GR consistency condition (as seen by prescriptivism)
{ 1 } - "Good" can be defined using ideas from sense experience.
{ 2 } - Statement that is testable by sense experience (and thus can in principle be shown by sense experience to be true or at least highly probable)
{ 3 } - Known truth that requires no further proof or justification
{ 4 } - Moral judgments, while they express emotions and not truth claims, are rational to the extent that they are informed and impartial
{ 5 } - This combination is logically inconsistent: (a) I believe that I ought to do something to another, and (b) I don't desire that this be done to me in the same situation
empirical statement <=> Statement that is testable by sense experience (and thus can in principle be shown by sense experience to be true or at least highly probable)
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3 is wrong. Please try again.
GR consistency condition (as seen by prescriptivism)
{ 1 } - "Good" can be defined using ideas from sense experience.
{ 2 } - Statement that is testable by sense experience (and thus can in principle be shown by sense experience to be true or at least highly probable)
{ 3 } - Known truth that requires no further proof or justification
{ 4 } - Moral judgments, while they express emotions and not truth claims, are rational to the extent that they are informed and impartial
{ 5 } - This combination is logically inconsistent: (a) I believe that I ought to do something to another, and (b) I don't desire that this be done to me in the same situation
self-evident truth (first principle) <=> Known truth that requires no further proof or justification
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4 is wrong. Please try again.
GR consistency condition (as seen by prescriptivism)
{ 1 } - "Good" can be defined using ideas from sense experience.
{ 2 } - Statement that is testable by sense experience (and thus can in principle be shown by sense experience to be true or at least highly probable)
{ 3 } - Known truth that requires no further proof or justification
{ 4 } - Moral judgments, while they express emotions and not truth claims, are rational to the extent that they are informed and impartial
{ 5 } - This combination is logically inconsistent: (a) I believe that I ought to do something to another, and (b) I don't desire that this be done to me in the same situation
moderate emotivism <=> Moral judgments, while they express emotions and not truth claims, are rational to the extent that they are informed and impartial
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5 is correct!
GR consistency condition (as seen by prescriptivism)
{ 1 } - "Good" can be defined using ideas from sense experience.
{ 2 } - Statement that is testable by sense experience (and thus can in principle be shown by sense experience to be true or at least highly probable)
{ 3 } - Known truth that requires no further proof or justification
{ 4 } - Moral judgments, while they express emotions and not truth claims, are rational to the extent that they are informed and impartial
{ 5 } - This combination is logically inconsistent: (a) I believe that I ought to do something to another, and (b) I don't desire that this be done to me in the same situation
GR consistency condition (as seen by prescriptivism) <=> This combination is logically inconsistent: (a) I believe that I ought to do something to another, and (b) I don't desire that this be done to me in the same situation
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Before continuing, you might try some wrong answers.
the end