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Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.

    { 1 } - emotivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - utilitarianism justification

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1 is wrong. Please try again.

Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.

Our judgments in favor of impartiality express our (actual or ideal) feelings in favor of it. <=> emotivism justification

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2 is wrong. Please try again.

Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.

    { 1 } - emotivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - utilitarianism justification

Violating impartiality is inherently bad and thus ought other-things-equal to be avoided. <=> prima-facie-duty justification

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3 is correct!

Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.

    { 1 } - emotivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - utilitarianism justification

Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency. <=> prescriptivism justification

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4 is wrong. Please try again.

Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.

    { 1 } - emotivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - utilitarianism justification

We ought to be impartial because God desires this. <=> divine-command-theory justification

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5 is wrong. Please try again.

Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.

    { 1 } - emotivism justification
    { 2 } - prima-facie-duty justification
    { 3 } - prescriptivism justification
    { 4 } - divine-command-theory justification
    { 5 } - utilitarianism justification

We ought to accept universalizability and impartiality because these have a crucial social function. They make possible important kinds of moral reasoning, and they promote a neutral standpoint for settling disputes and reaching a moral consensus. These make life better for everyone. <=> utilitarianism justification

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