Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.
Our judgments in favor of impartiality express our (actual or ideal) feelings in favor of it. <=> emotivism justification
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.
Violating impartiality is inherently bad and thus ought other-things-equal to be avoided. <=> prima-facie-duty justification
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency. <=> prescriptivism justification
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.
We ought to be impartial because God desires this. <=> divine-command-theory justification
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to making similar judgments about similar cases. Thus impartiality is justified as a species of logical consistency.
We ought to accept universalizability and impartiality because these have a crucial social function. They make possible important kinds of moral reasoning, and they promote a neutral standpoint for settling disputes and reaching a moral consensus. These make life better for everyone. <=> utilitarianism justification