Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), "I ought to do A to X" logically commits us to the particular prescription "If the situation were reversed, let X do A to me." Thus violations of GR are violations of logical consistency.
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), "I ought to do A to X" logically commits us to the particular prescription "If the situation were reversed, let X do A to me." Thus violations of GR are violations of logical consistency.
We have a basic prima facie duty to treat others as we want to be treated. <=> prima-facie-duty justification
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), "I ought to do A to X" logically commits us to the particular prescription "If the situation were reversed, let X do A to me." Thus violations of GR are violations of logical consistency.
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), "I ought to do A to X" logically commits us to the particular prescription "If the situation were reversed, let X do A to me." Thus violations of GR are violations of logical consistency. <=> prescriptivism justification
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), "I ought to do A to X" logically commits us to the particular prescription "If the situation were reversed, let X do A to me." Thus violations of GR are violations of logical consistency.
We follow GR because it promotes our own well-being and self-respect -- and because it earns us the respect and appreciation of others. <=> self-interested-desire justification
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), "I ought to do A to X" logically commits us to the particular prescription "If the situation were reversed, let X do A to me." Thus violations of GR are violations of logical consistency.
We ought to follow GR because an ideal observer would desire this. <=> ideal-observer-theory justification
Since an ought judgment is a universalizable prescription (and not a factual claim), "I ought to do A to X" logically commits us to the particular prescription "If the situation were reversed, let X do A to me." Thus violations of GR are violations of logical consistency.
We follow GR because we care about others and hence want to treat them in a way that respects their inherent dignity as persons. <=> idealistic-desire justification