What is your answer?
Which claim ISN'T an essential part of Ayer's defense of emotivism?
{ 1 } - Truth claims (except for analytic ones) must be empirically verifiable.
{ 2 } - Moral judgments aren't analytic (since they aren't true by definition).
{ 3 } - Moral judgments move us to action.
{ 4 } - Moral judgments must be emotive if they aren't truth claims.
{ 5 } - "Good" isn't definable in empirical terms.
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Directions: Click on a number from 1 to 5.
1 is wrong. Please try again.
Which claim ISN'T an essential part of Ayer's defense of emotivism?
{ 1 } - Truth claims (except for analytic ones) must be empirically verifiable.
{ 2 } - Moral judgments aren't analytic (since they aren't true by definition).
{ 3 } - Moral judgments move us to action.
{ 4 } - Moral judgments must be emotive if they aren't truth claims.
{ 5 } - "Good" isn't definable in empirical terms.
This principle -- the verifiability criterion of meaning -- was important in his reasoning.
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2 is wrong. Please try again.
Which claim ISN'T an essential part of Ayer's defense of emotivism?
{ 1 } - Truth claims (except for analytic ones) must be empirically verifiable.
{ 2 } - Moral judgments aren't analytic (since they aren't true by definition).
{ 3 } - Moral judgments move us to action.
{ 4 } - Moral judgments must be emotive if they aren't truth claims.
{ 5 } - "Good" isn't definable in empirical terms.
This was important in his reasoning, since analytic statements don't have to be empirically verifiable.
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3 is correct!
Which claim ISN'T an essential part of Ayer's defense of emotivism?
{ 1 } - Truth claims (except for analytic ones) must be empirically verifiable.
{ 2 } - Moral judgments aren't analytic (since they aren't true by definition).
{ 3 } - Moral judgments move us to action.
{ 4 } - Moral judgments must be emotive if they aren't truth claims.
{ 5 } - "Good" isn't definable in empirical terms.
Hume used this idea, not Ayer. Ayer reasoned this way:
Truth claims (except for analytic ones) must be empirically verifiable. But moral judgments aren't empirically verifiable -- since "good" isn't definable in empirical terms. And moral judgments aren't analytic (since they aren't true by definition). It follows that moral judgments aren't truth claims. But then they must be emotive.
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Before continuing, you might try some wrong answers.
4 is wrong. Please try again.
Which claim ISN'T an essential part of Ayer's defense of emotivism?
{ 1 } - Truth claims (except for analytic ones) must be empirically verifiable.
{ 2 } - Moral judgments aren't analytic (since they aren't true by definition).
{ 3 } - Moral judgments move us to action.
{ 4 } - Moral judgments must be emotive if they aren't truth claims.
{ 5 } - "Good" isn't definable in empirical terms.
This was important in his reasoning.
But there are other things that moral judgments might be if they aren't truth claims. They might be imperatives, for example.
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5 is wrong. Please try again.
Which claim ISN'T an essential part of Ayer's defense of emotivism?
{ 1 } - Truth claims (except for analytic ones) must be empirically verifiable.
{ 2 } - Moral judgments aren't analytic (since they aren't true by definition).
{ 3 } - Moral judgments move us to action.
{ 4 } - Moral judgments must be emotive if they aren't truth claims.
{ 5 } - "Good" isn't definable in empirical terms.
This was important in his reasoning, since it led him to conclude that moral judgments aren't empirically verifiable.
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the end