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Many philosophers claim: "Ordinary people, when they think that they aren't perceiving material objects, think that they're deceived by their senses." Austin objects to this by pointing out
{ 1 } - that if people knew that a ship on a clear day is further away than it looks, they wouldn't conclude that they aren't perceiving a material object.
{ 2 } - that if people thought that they saw a shadow (or rainbow) or heard a voice -- and became convinced that this shadow (or rainbow or voice) wasn't a "material object" -- then they wouldn't conclude that they were deceived by their senses.
{ 3 } - both of the above.
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Many philosophers claim: "Ordinary people, when they think that they aren't perceiving material objects, think that they're deceived by their senses." Austin objects to this by pointing out
{ 1 } - that if people knew that a ship on a clear day is further away than it looks, they wouldn't conclude that they aren't perceiving a material object.
{ 2 } - that if people thought that they saw a shadow (or rainbow) or heard a voice -- and became convinced that this shadow (or rainbow or voice) wasn't a "material object" -- then they wouldn't conclude that they were deceived by their senses.
{ 3 } - both of the above.
This objection isn't relavent to the claim quoted above.
Read the claim again -- slowly and carefully.
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2 is correct!
Many philosophers claim: "Ordinary people, when they think that they aren't perceiving material objects, think that they're deceived by their senses." Austin objects to this by pointing out
{ 1 } - that if people knew that a ship on a clear day is further away than it looks, they wouldn't conclude that they aren't perceiving a material object.
{ 2 } - that if people thought that they saw a shadow (or rainbow) or heard a voice -- and became convinced that this shadow (or rainbow or voice) wasn't a "material object" -- then they wouldn't conclude that they were deceived by their senses.
{ 3 } - both of the above.
Of course, people wouldn't conclude this.
Austin adds that "material object" is obscure and poorly defined. Are shadows, rainbows, and voices "material objects"? Philosophers explain this term poorly, using only a few examples like tables and chairs.
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3 is wrong. Please try again.
Many philosophers claim: "Ordinary people, when they think that they aren't perceiving material objects, think that they're deceived by their senses." Austin objects to this by pointing out
{ 1 } - that if people knew that a ship on a clear day is further away than it looks, they wouldn't conclude that they aren't perceiving a material object.
{ 2 } - that if people thought that they saw a shadow (or rainbow) or heard a voice -- and became convinced that this shadow (or rainbow or voice) wasn't a "material object" -- then they wouldn't conclude that they were deceived by their senses.
{ 3 } - both of the above.
Just one is relevant to the claim.
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the end