What is your answer?
One objection to the ideal observer view is that
{ 1 } - the "impartiality" condition is unclear.
{ 2 } - ideal observers might disagree on some issues.
{ 3 } - the condition to be "fully informed" seems too idealized.
{ 4 } - the view arbitrarily gives us just two rationality conditions.
{ 5 } - all of the above seem to be objections.
<= back | menu | forward =>
Directions: Click on a number from 1 to 5.
1 is wrong. Please try again.
One objection to the ideal observer view is that
{ 1 } - the "impartiality" condition is unclear.
{ 2 } - ideal observers might disagree on some issues.
{ 3 } - the condition to be "fully informed" seems too idealized.
{ 4 } - the view arbitrarily gives us just two rationality conditions.
{ 5 } - all of the above seem to be objections.
Does it require that we have an equal concern for everyone, regardless of whether the person is our child or a complete stranger? Would this be a good thing?
<= back | menu | forward =>
2 is wrong. Please try again.
One objection to the ideal observer view is that
{ 1 } - the "impartiality" condition is unclear.
{ 2 } - ideal observers might disagree on some issues.
{ 3 } - the condition to be "fully informed" seems too idealized.
{ 4 } - the view arbitrarily gives us just two rationality conditions.
{ 5 } - all of the above seem to be objections.
If they disagree, then should we take "good" to be what "most" (not "all") ideal observers would desire? Or should we each follow what we as individuals would desire if we were ideal observers?
<= back | menu | forward =>
3 is wrong. Please try again.
One objection to the ideal observer view is that
{ 1 } - the "impartiality" condition is unclear.
{ 2 } - ideal observers might disagree on some issues.
{ 3 } - the condition to be "fully informed" seems too idealized.
{ 4 } - the view arbitrarily gives us just two rationality conditions.
{ 5 } - all of the above seem to be objections.
Would it require an infinite amount of knowledge, and thus an infinite brain? If we humans are incapable of being fully informed, does it even make sense to ask what we'd desire if we were fully informed?
<= back | menu | forward =>
4 is wrong. Please try again.
One objection to the ideal observer view is that
{ 1 } - the "impartiality" condition is unclear.
{ 2 } - ideal observers might disagree on some issues.
{ 3 } - the condition to be "fully informed" seems too idealized.
{ 4 } - the view arbitrarily gives us just two rationality conditions.
{ 5 } - all of the above seem to be objections.
Are there other conditions besides these two? For example, do we also need to be consistent? Some authors include consistency and other things as well. How do we decide what rationality conditions to include?
<= back | menu | forward =>
5 is correct!
One objection to the ideal observer view is that
{ 1 } - the "impartiality" condition is unclear.
{ 2 } - ideal observers might disagree on some issues.
{ 3 } - the condition to be "fully informed" seems too idealized.
{ 4 } - the view arbitrarily gives us just two rationality conditions.
{ 5 } - all of the above seem to be objections.
Despite these problems, the ideal observer view has important insights. Any better view would likely need to build on its insights.
<= back | menu | forward =>
Before continuing, you might try some wrong answers.
the end