It's sometimes objected that prescriptivism, in claiming that moral judgments aren't literally true or false, conflicts with how we approach ethics in our daily lives.
It's sometimes objected that prescriptivism, in claiming that moral judgments aren't literally true or false, conflicts with how we approach ethics in our daily lives.
When we deliberate about a moral issue, we assume that there's a truth of the matter that we're trying to discover. We use terms like "true," "false," "correct," "mistaken," "know," "discover," and "believe" of moral judgments -- but not of imperatives.
Prescriptivists have to say that our moral practice is wrong -- or at least that its claims have to be watered down (maybe calling an ought judgment "true" just endorses the judgment and doesn't make an objective claim). While these responses are possible, the presumption lies with our moral practice. We should accept moral truths and moral knowledge unless we have strong arguments to the contrary.
It's sometimes objected that prescriptivism, in claiming that moral judgments aren't literally true or false, conflicts with how we approach ethics in our daily lives.
When we deliberate about a moral issue, we assume that there's a truth of the matter that we're trying to discover. We use terms like "true," "false," "correct," "mistaken," "know," "discover," and "believe" of moral judgments -- but not of imperatives.
Prescriptivists have to say that our moral practice is wrong -- or at least that its claims have to be watered down (maybe calling an ought judgment "true" just endorses the judgment and doesn't make an objective claim). While these responses are possible, the presumption lies with our moral practice. We should accept moral truths and moral knowledge unless we have strong arguments to the contrary.