What is your answer?

Ima Prescriptivist thinks that moral judgments are much like imperatives, since both

    { 1 } - can be unemotional.
    { 2 } - can be highly rational.
    { 3 } - He accepts both similarities.
    { 4 } - None of the above.

<= back | menu | forward =>
Directions: Click on a number from 1 to 4.
























 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

























1 is wrong. Please try again.

Ima Prescriptivist thinks that moral judgments are much like imperatives, since both

Directions for cooking a meal or setting up a computer tell you what to do (instead of stating facts); but they needn't be more emotional than factual judgments. Similarly, moral judgments needn't be very emotional -- unlike "Boo!" and "Hurrah!"

But the other similarity is important too.

<= back | menu | forward =>
























 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

























2 is wrong. Please try again.

Ima Prescriptivist thinks that moral judgments are much like imperatives, since both

    { 1 } - can be unemotional.
    { 2 } - can be highly rational.
    { 3 } - He accepts both similarities.
    { 4 } - None of the above.

Many impressive human achievements are complex systems of imperatives. Consider our country's laws, the rules for chess, and the directions for using a complex computer program. A computer program itself is a set of instructions that tell the computer what to do under what conditions. So imperatives can be highly rational. By contrast, exclamations are primitive grunts.

But the other similarity is important too.

<= back | menu | forward =>
























 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

























3 is correct!

Ima Prescriptivist thinks that moral judgments are much like imperatives, since both

    { 1 } - can be unemotional.
    { 2 } - can be highly rational.
    { 3 } - He accepts both similarities.
    { 4 } - None of the above.

So, Ima claims, imperatives give a better model for moral discourse.

<= back | menu | forward =>
Before continuing, you might try some wrong answers.
























 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

























4 is wrong. Please try again.

Ima Prescriptivist thinks that moral judgments are much like imperatives, since both

    { 1 } - can be unemotional.
    { 2 } - can be highly rational.
    { 3 } - He accepts both similarities.
    { 4 } - None of the above.

What then?

<= back | menu | forward =>
























 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

























the end