Our judgments in favor of conscientiousness express our (actual or ideal) feelings in favor of it.
Our judgments in favor of conscientiousness express our (actual or ideal) feelings in favor of it.
Violating conscientiousness is inherently bad and thus ought other-things-equal to be avoided. <=> prima-facie-duty justification
Our judgments in favor of conscientiousness express our (actual or ideal) feelings in favor of it.
We know through our actual or ideal moral intuitions that we ought to be conscientious. <=> intuitionism justification
Our judgments in favor of conscientiousness express our (actual or ideal) feelings in favor of it.
Our judgments in favor of conscientiousness express our (actual or ideal) feelings in favor of it. <=> emotivism justification
Our judgments in favor of conscientiousness express our (actual or ideal) feelings in favor of it.
Since an ought judgment is a truth that logically entails the corresponding imperative, such judgments have a rational authority. If we accept an ought judgment but don't act on it, then we are logically inconsistent and violate rationality. <=> Kantian justification
Our judgments in favor of conscientiousness express our (actual or ideal) feelings in favor of it.
Since an ought judgment is a prescription that logically entails the corresponding imperative (and not a factual claim), ought judgments logically commit us to action under pain of inconsistency. Thus conscientiousness is justified as a species of logical consistency. <=> prescriptivism justification