Kant in a footnote objected that GR doesn't cover benevolence duties to others (for we might consent that others not benefit us) -- while the formula of universal law does cover these. To this we may respond that
Kant in a footnote objected that GR doesn't cover benevolence duties to others (for we might consent that others not benefit us) -- while the formula of universal law does cover these. To this we may respond that
Kant in a footnote objected that GR doesn't cover benevolence duties to others (for we might consent that others not benefit us) -- while the formula of universal law does cover these. To this we may respond that
Both lead to benevolence if we assume certain desires for one's own welfare which, I argue, it would be rational to have. (Kant himself sometimes appeals to rational desires.) Recall that, to avoid benevolence toward those who are weak and greatly need help, you must consent to the idea that others not do good to you in similar imagined or future situations where you are weak and greatly need help.