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Mill considers the objection that virtue (and not just pleasure) is desired for its own sake. He answers that
{ 1 } - virtue is then part of our pleasure -- since we get pleasure out of virtue.
{ 2 } - this shows that something besides pleasure is good in itself.
{ 3 } - virtue is never desired for its own sake.
{ 4 } - virtue at first was desired only as a means to pleasure, but later came to be desired (but falsely) for its own sake.
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Directions: Click on a number from 1 to 4.
1 is correct!
Mill considers the objection that virtue (and not just pleasure) is desired for its own sake. He answers that
{ 1 } - virtue is then part of our pleasure -- since we get pleasure out of virtue.
{ 2 } - this shows that something besides pleasure is good in itself.
{ 3 } - virtue is never desired for its own sake.
{ 4 } - virtue at first was desired only as a means to pleasure, but later came to be desired (but falsely) for its own sake.
As we get pleasure from eating and drinking, so too we get pleasure from virtue. We can pursue each of these pleasures for its own sake.
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Before continuing, you might try some wrong answers.
2 is wrong. Please try again.
Mill considers the objection that virtue (and not just pleasure) is desired for its own sake. He answers that
{ 1 } - virtue is then part of our pleasure -- since we get pleasure out of virtue.
{ 2 } - this shows that something besides pleasure is good in itself.
{ 3 } - virtue is never desired for its own sake.
{ 4 } - virtue at first was desired only as a means to pleasure, but later came to be desired (but falsely) for its own sake.
This would be to give up his hedonistic view of value.
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3 is wrong. Please try again.
Mill considers the objection that virtue (and not just pleasure) is desired for its own sake. He answers that
{ 1 } - virtue is then part of our pleasure -- since we get pleasure out of virtue.
{ 2 } - this shows that something besides pleasure is good in itself.
{ 3 } - virtue is never desired for its own sake.
{ 4 } - virtue at first was desired only as a means to pleasure, but later came to be desired (but falsely) for its own sake.
He might have argued this way (saying that we only desire the pleasure that virtue gives us), but he didn't.
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4 is wrong. Please try again.
Mill considers the objection that virtue (and not just pleasure) is desired for its own sake. He answers that
{ 1 } - virtue is then part of our pleasure -- since we get pleasure out of virtue.
{ 2 } - this shows that something besides pleasure is good in itself.
{ 3 } - virtue is never desired for its own sake.
{ 4 } - virtue at first was desired only as a means to pleasure, but later came to be desired (but falsely) for its own sake.
Mill doesn't use the notion of a "false desire." He thinks rather that virtue becomes part of our pleasure.
As we get pleasure from eating and drinking, so too we get pleasure from virtue. We can pursue each of these pleasures for its own sake.
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the end