Interests (e.g., pleasures and pains) of animals should be given the same basic consideration as similar interests of human beings.
Interests (e.g., pleasures and pains) of animals should be given the same basic consideration as similar interests of human beings.
Singer sees this as true.
Singer claims that similar interests of animals and humans merit equal consideration. Speciesists say all humans deserve equal consideration, but greater consideration than animals. Singer sees this as indefensible -- since there are no morally relevant distinguishing qualities that humans all have (even infants and the comatose), and have equally, but no animal has; so the only non-arbitrary view is equal consideration for all sentient beings.
Interests (e.g., pleasures and pains) of animals should be given the same basic consideration as similar interests of human beings.
Singer sees this as true.
Singer claims that similar interests of animals and humans merit equal consideration. Speciesists say all humans deserve equal consideration, but greater consideration than animals. Singer sees this as indefensible -- since there are no morally relevant distinguishing qualities that humans all have (even infants and the comatose), and have equally, but no animal has; so the only non-arbitrary view is equal consideration for all sentient beings.
Interests (e.g., pleasures and pains) of animals should be given the same basic consideration as similar interests of human beings.
Singer sees this as true.
Singer claims that similar interests of animals and humans merit equal consideration. Speciesists say all humans deserve equal consideration, but greater consideration than animals. Singer sees this as indefensible -- since there are no morally relevant distinguishing qualities that humans all have (even infants and the comatose), and have equally, but no animal has; so the only non-arbitrary view is equal consideration for all sentient beings.