One problem raised against emotivism is that moral judgments, instead of being essentially emotional, seem to run the spectrum from "very emotional" to "not very emotional."
One problem raised against emotivism is that moral judgments, instead of being essentially emotional, seem to run the spectrum from "very emotional" to "not very emotional."
This is a problem with emotivism. We all have some moral convictions that are emotional for us (maybe about the wrongness of racism) and others that are unemotional (maybe about the wrongness of some tax exemptions).
Emotivism says that all moral judgments are emotional exclamations -- like "Boo!" and "Hurrah!" But some moral judgments seem to be very unemotional.
One problem raised against emotivism is that moral judgments, instead of being essentially emotional, seem to run the spectrum from "very emotional" to "not very emotional."
This is a problem with emotivism. We all have some moral convictions that are emotional for us (maybe about the wrongness of racism) and others that are unemotional (maybe about the wrongness of some tax exemptions).
Emotivism says that all moral judgments are emotional exclamations -- like "Boo!" and "Hurrah!" But some moral judgments seem to be very unemotional.