What is your answer?
How does Plantinga object to this inference -- which is a key step in Aquinas's "third way" argument for the existence of God?
Every contingent being at some time or other fails to exist.
Therefore, if everything is contingent, then there's some one time when everything fails to exist.
{ 1 } - The inference is invalid -- the conclusion doesn't follow.
{ 2 } - This step assumes that a necessary being would have to be God.
{ 3 } - Plantinga thinks that this inference is perfectly fine.
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Directions: Click on a number from 1 to 3.
1 is correct!
How does Plantinga object to this inference -- which is a key step in Aquinas's "third way" argument for the existence of God?
Every contingent being at some time or other fails to exist.
Therefore, if everything is contingent, then there's some one time when everything fails to exist.
{ 1 } - The inference is invalid -- the conclusion doesn't follow.
{ 2 } - This step assumes that a necessary being would have to be God.
{ 3 } - Plantinga thinks that this inference is perfectly fine.
It could be that each contingent being at some time or other fails to exist -- but there's no one time when everything fails to exist. Here's a similar bad argument:
Every Parma resident at some time or other is away from Parma.
Therefore, there's some one time when every Parma resident is away from Parma.
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Before continuing, you might try some wrong answers.
2 is wrong. Please try again.
How does Plantinga object to this inference -- which is a key step in Aquinas's "third way" argument for the existence of God?
Every contingent being at some time or other fails to exist.
Therefore, if everything is contingent, then there's some one time when everything fails to exist.
{ 1 } - The inference is invalid -- the conclusion doesn't follow.
{ 2 } - This step assumes that a necessary being would have to be God.
{ 3 } - Plantinga thinks that this inference is perfectly fine.
This is a problem with another part of the argument.
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3 is wrong. Please try again.
How does Plantinga object to this inference -- which is a key step in Aquinas's "third way" argument for the existence of God?
Every contingent being at some time or other fails to exist.
Therefore, if everything is contingent, then there's some one time when everything fails to exist.
{ 1 } - The inference is invalid -- the conclusion doesn't follow.
{ 2 } - This step assumes that a necessary being would have to be God.
{ 3 } - Plantinga thinks that this inference is perfectly fine.
No he doesn't!
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the end